Select to expand quoteChris 249 said..
It's interesting, though, that while the C32 has become a reference point, their actual record in that race for capsizing seems to have been the same as that of the other boats in Class V (about 32-28ft). Years ago I went through old mags and books and analysed Class V knockdowns in the '79 Fastnet. Forty seven percent of the boats in the whole class were knocked down. Fifty percent of the 12 "unsafe" Grimalkin-style boats were knocked down. Forty five percent of the 11 Contessa 32s were knocked down. There's therefore NO statistical evidence that Contessas were less likely to be knocked down than an "unsafe" boat of the same class (the 5% difference isn't statistically significant).
The C32s were theoretically less likely to be inverted or get close to it - but in the '79 Fastnet they would have been in a different area than the "unsafe" boats so maybe that is the reason they were less likely to invert in reality. Or maybe the C32s copped the worst of the storm - we'll never know.
However, in the '98 Hobart the old-style boats were statistically MORE likely to be inverted than modern boats, and yet that's often ignored. Similarly, in '98 and, I think, in '79, inversion was far from the main cause of death. Flashlight, a slender RORC-style hull similar to the C32, lost multiple crew in a knockdown in '79 but that was largely ignored. Cole 43s, a boat with an extremely high LPS, have rolled more than once in the Hobart and Solo Globe Challenger was lucky to survive. A very good S&S 34 inverted in the Hobart. One of the most stable boats in the race was badly knocked down and lost a man overboard and could not recover him - miraculously he was saved by a helicopter that was overhead on its way to another mission. A heavy Swanson 42 sank. So in the real world, the actual safety advantages of a boat like the C32 can arguably be said to be a heck of a lot less than the Wolfson Unit states.
It's arguably like saying that a certain Mercedes car is safer in a 120kmh roll-over than a certain Hyundai. It may be true, but it's also an incredibly minor risk among all the other risks in life and in driving. There's a known human tendency to over-rate the potential danger of exceptional risks, and under-rate the potential danger of more mundane risks. In the real world of other trade-offs, the average person is almost certainly safer if they buy a Hyundai and spend the price difference in going to the gym/getting less work stress/a health check up/etc, and it could well be the same in sailing.
I think racing crews tend to keep sailing regardless of the conditions rather than employ other survival tactics such as heaving to or using drag devices, that should be taken into account.
Select to expand quotecammd said..Chris 249 said..
It's interesting, though, that while the C32 has become a reference point, their actual record in that race for capsizing seems to have been the same as that of the other boats in Class V (about 32-28ft). Years ago I went through old mags and books and analysed Class V knockdowns in the '79 Fastnet. Forty seven percent of the boats in the whole class were knocked down. Fifty percent of the 12 "unsafe" Grimalkin-style boats were knocked down. Forty five percent of the 11 Contessa 32s were knocked down. There's therefore NO statistical evidence that Contessas were less likely to be knocked down than an "unsafe" boat of the same class (the 5% difference isn't statistically significant).
The C32s were theoretically less likely to be inverted or get close to it - but in the '79 Fastnet they would have been in a different area than the "unsafe" boats so maybe that is the reason they were less likely to invert in reality. Or maybe the C32s copped the worst of the storm - we'll never know.
However, in the '98 Hobart the old-style boats were statistically MORE likely to be inverted than modern boats, and yet that's often ignored. Similarly, in '98 and, I think, in '79, inversion was far from the main cause of death. Flashlight, a slender RORC-style hull similar to the C32, lost multiple crew in a knockdown in '79 but that was largely ignored. Cole 43s, a boat with an extremely high LPS, have rolled more than once in the Hobart and Solo Globe Challenger was lucky to survive. A very good S&S 34 inverted in the Hobart. One of the most stable boats in the race was badly knocked down and lost a man overboard and could not recover him - miraculously he was saved by a helicopter that was overhead on its way to another mission. A heavy Swanson 42 sank. So in the real world, the actual safety advantages of a boat like the C32 can arguably be said to be a heck of a lot less than the Wolfson Unit states.
It's arguably like saying that a certain Mercedes car is safer in a 120kmh roll-over than a certain Hyundai. It may be true, but it's also an incredibly minor risk among all the other risks in life and in driving. There's a known human tendency to over-rate the potential danger of exceptional risks, and under-rate the potential danger of more mundane risks. In the real world of other trade-offs, the average person is almost certainly safer if they buy a Hyundai and spend the price difference in going to the gym/getting less work stress/a health check up/etc, and it could well be the same in sailing.
I think racing crews tend to keep sailing regardless of the conditions rather than employ other survival tactics such as heaving to or using drag devices, that should be taken into account.
There's plenty of accounts that show that in '98 and '79 many crews were NOT sailing regardless. In fact in 1979 the Aussie who wo the Admiral's Cup (in which the Fastnet was the last race) gave lectures when they came back in which they said that the best tactic was to keep sailing.
The fact that the non-racing boats in the area of the '79 storm had a far higher death rate than the racing boats also indicates that it wasn't the way the racing boats were handled that was the problem.
Select to expand quoteChris 249 said..cammd said..Chris 249 said..
It's interesting, though, that while the C32 has become a reference point, their actual record in that race for capsizing seems to have been the same as that of the other boats in Class V (about 32-28ft). Years ago I went through old mags and books and analysed Class V knockdowns in the '79 Fastnet. Forty seven percent of the boats in the whole class were knocked down. Fifty percent of the 12 "unsafe" Grimalkin-style boats were knocked down. Forty five percent of the 11 Contessa 32s were knocked down. There's therefore NO statistical evidence that Contessas were less likely to be knocked down than an "unsafe" boat of the same class (the 5% difference isn't statistically significant).
The C32s were theoretically less likely to be inverted or get close to it - but in the '79 Fastnet they would have been in a different area than the "unsafe" boats so maybe that is the reason they were less likely to invert in reality. Or maybe the C32s copped the worst of the storm - we'll never know.
However, in the '98 Hobart the old-style boats were statistically MORE likely to be inverted than modern boats, and yet that's often ignored. Similarly, in '98 and, I think, in '79, inversion was far from the main cause of death. Flashlight, a slender RORC-style hull similar to the C32, lost multiple crew in a knockdown in '79 but that was largely ignored. Cole 43s, a boat with an extremely high LPS, have rolled more than once in the Hobart and Solo Globe Challenger was lucky to survive. A very good S&S 34 inverted in the Hobart. One of the most stable boats in the race was badly knocked down and lost a man overboard and could not recover him - miraculously he was saved by a helicopter that was overhead on its way to another mission. A heavy Swanson 42 sank. So in the real world, the actual safety advantages of a boat like the C32 can arguably be said to be a heck of a lot less than the Wolfson Unit states.
It's arguably like saying that a certain Mercedes car is safer in a 120kmh roll-over than a certain Hyundai. It may be true, but it's also an incredibly minor risk among all the other risks in life and in driving. There's a known human tendency to over-rate the potential danger of exceptional risks, and under-rate the potential danger of more mundane risks. In the real world of other trade-offs, the average person is almost certainly safer if they buy a Hyundai and spend the price difference in going to the gym/getting less work stress/a health check up/etc, and it could well be the same in sailing.
I think racing crews tend to keep sailing regardless of the conditions rather than employ other survival tactics such as heaving to or using drag devices, that should be taken into account.
There's plenty of accounts that show that in '98 and '79 many crews were NOT sailing regardless. In fact in 1979 the Aussie who wo the Admiral's Cup (in which the Fastnet was the last race) gave lectures when they came back in which they said that the best tactic was to keep sailing.
The fact that the non-racing boats in the area of the '79 storm had a far higher death rate than the racing boats also indicates that it wasn't the way the racing boats were handled that was the problem.
I don't understand what your saying, on one hand your saying skills required to keep a boat in the groove is more important than sail choices and on the other your saying boat handling is not the problem
personally I think surviving heavy weather comes down to seamanship which is more than just the abililty to sail a boat in the groove.
Select to expand quoteChris 249 said..
It's interesting, though, that while the C32 has become a reference point, their actual record in that race for capsizing seems to have been the same as that of the other boats in Class V (about 32-28ft). Years ago I went through old mags and books and analysed Class V knockdowns in the '79 Fastnet. Forty seven percent of the boats in the whole class were knocked down. Fifty percent of the 12 "unsafe" Grimalkin-style boats were knocked down. Forty five percent of the 11 Contessa 32s were knocked down. There's therefore NO statistical evidence that Contessas were less likely to be knocked down than an "unsafe" boat of the same class (the 5% difference isn't statistically significant).
The C32s were theoretically less likely to be inverted or get close to it - but in the '79 Fastnet they would have been in a different area than the "unsafe" boats so maybe that is the reason they were less likely to invert in reality. Or maybe the C32s copped the worst of the storm - we'll never know.
However, in the '98 Hobart the old-style boats were statistically MORE likely to be inverted than modern boats, and yet that's often ignored. Similarly, in '98 and, I think, in '79, inversion was far from the main cause of death. Flashlight, a slender RORC-style hull similar to the C32, lost multiple crew in a knockdown in '79 but that was largely ignored. Cole 43s, a boat with an extremely high LPS, have rolled more than once in the Hobart and Solo Globe Challenger was lucky to survive. A very good S&S 34 inverted in the Hobart. One of the most stable boats in the race was badly knocked down and lost a man overboard and could not recover him - miraculously he was saved by a helicopter that was overhead on its way to another mission. A heavy Swanson 42 sank. So in the real world, the actual safety advantages of a boat like the C32 can arguably be said to be a heck of a lot less than the Wolfson Unit states.
It's arguably like saying that a certain Mercedes car is safer in a 120kmh roll-over than a certain Hyundai. It may be true, but it's also an incredibly minor risk among all the other risks in life and in driving. There's a known human tendency to over-rate the potential danger of exceptional risks, and under-rate the potential danger of more mundane risks. In the real world of other trade-offs, the average person is almost certainly safer if they buy a Hyundai and spend the price difference in going to the gym/getting less work stress/a health check up/etc, and it could well be the same in sailing.
PS - it's also interesting that the highest death rate by far among sailing craft around Fastnet during that storm came from cruising boats and a multi, yet for some reason the '70s IOR boats were singled out despite the fact that they statistically had fewer deaths than older boats.
I have an interview with a crew of that S&S34. It is very interesting but is in pdf format and I don't know how to post it here.
Further to Chris comments, I understand the only S&S34 lost at sea was Morning Tide about 15 years ago off the NSW north coast. She got knocked down and due to a modified rudder broke the rudder post riser. By the time they found the source of the water the rescue helicopter was overhead. The crew got winched up and watched Morning Tide sink.
A previous owner had extended the rudder by about a metre with the original pintles and skeg.
Statistically an S&S34 sank after a knock down, the stats don't mention the modifications.
You should always assess risk on probability first and consequence second. You them mitigate to get to an acceptable risk level, or don't do it. Too many people assess the consequence of a risk first, in which case you should never get out of bed as you might die if you do.
Hello MB - greatly appreciate if you can post that interview. If you can use your Snipping Tool to frame out that pdf image and save it as a jpg, then save it to your seabreeze photos and post it this will work - eg see pdf file of original photo below of Javelin race start Toronto late 70s or early 80s which I Snipped and saved as a jpg so can post it. Your interview pdf file might need a few jpg file pages saves.
Cripes adding ~1m to the rudder with no other strengthening to anything? What was the thinking?
Haven't done any risky activities today except continuing to work from home and having to field a phone call as to why I wasn't in the office so as to be on the same page and communicating with everyone.........there is no page, no communication.................also got a haircut which has some risk but not much.........
Select to expand quoter13 said..
Hello MB - greatly appreciate if you can post that interview. If you can use your Snipping Tool to frame out that pdf image and save it as a jpg, then save it to your seabreeze photos and post it this will work - eg see pdf file of original photo below of Javelin race start Toronto late 70s or early 80s which I Snipped and saved as a jpg so can post it. Your interview pdf file might need a few jpg file pages saves.
Cripes adding ~1m to the rudder with no other strengthening to anything? What was the thinking?
Haven't done any risky activities today except continuing to work from home and having to field a phone call as to why I wasn't in the office so as to be on the same page and communicating with everyone.........there is no page, no communication.................also got a haircut which has some risk but not much.........
It is a 35 page police interview. I could email it to anyone who wants to read it. The inability to link or post anything but photos is a shortcoming of this website.
Select to expand quotecammd said..Chris 249 said..cammd said..Chris 249 said..
It's interesting, though, that while the C32 has become a reference point, their actual record in that race for capsizing seems to have been the same as that of the other boats in Class V (about 32-28ft). Years ago I went through old mags and books and analysed Class V knockdowns in the '79 Fastnet. Forty seven percent of the boats in the whole class were knocked down. Fifty percent of the 12 "unsafe" Grimalkin-style boats were knocked down. Forty five percent of the 11 Contessa 32s were knocked down. There's therefore NO statistical evidence that Contessas were less likely to be knocked down than an "unsafe" boat of the same class (the 5% difference isn't statistically significant).
The C32s were theoretically less likely to be inverted or get close to it - but in the '79 Fastnet they would have been in a different area than the "unsafe" boats so maybe that is the reason they were less likely to invert in reality. Or maybe the C32s copped the worst of the storm - we'll never know.
However, in the '98 Hobart the old-style boats were statistically MORE likely to be inverted than modern boats, and yet that's often ignored. Similarly, in '98 and, I think, in '79, inversion was far from the main cause of death. Flashlight, a slender RORC-style hull similar to the C32, lost multiple crew in a knockdown in '79 but that was largely ignored. Cole 43s, a boat with an extremely high LPS, have rolled more than once in the Hobart and Solo Globe Challenger was lucky to survive. A very good S&S 34 inverted in the Hobart. One of the most stable boats in the race was badly knocked down and lost a man overboard and could not recover him - miraculously he was saved by a helicopter that was overhead on its way to another mission. A heavy Swanson 42 sank. So in the real world, the actual safety advantages of a boat like the C32 can arguably be said to be a heck of a lot less than the Wolfson Unit states.
It's arguably like saying that a certain Mercedes car is safer in a 120kmh roll-over than a certain Hyundai. It may be true, but it's also an incredibly minor risk among all the other risks in life and in driving. There's a known human tendency to over-rate the potential danger of exceptional risks, and under-rate the potential danger of more mundane risks. In the real world of other trade-offs, the average person is almost certainly safer if they buy a Hyundai and spend the price difference in going to the gym/getting less work stress/a health check up/etc, and it could well be the same in sailing.
I think racing crews tend to keep sailing regardless of the conditions rather than employ other survival tactics such as heaving to or using drag devices, that should be taken into account.
There's plenty of accounts that show that in '98 and '79 many crews were NOT sailing regardless. In fact in 1979 the Aussie who wo the Admiral's Cup (in which the Fastnet was the last race) gave lectures when they came back in which they said that the best tactic was to keep sailing.
The fact that the non-racing boats in the area of the '79 storm had a far higher death rate than the racing boats also indicates that it wasn't the way the racing boats were handled that was the problem.
I don't understand what your saying, on one hand your saying skills required to keep a boat in the groove is more important than sail choices and on the other your saying boat handling is not the problem
personally I think surviving heavy weather comes down to seamanship which is more than just the abililty to sail a boat in the groove.
I actually said "the difference in the skills of keeping the boat in the groove are more important than the details of what sails one is carrying a lot of the time" which doesn't mean that boat handling isn't the problem - the skills of keeping the boat in the groove are largely the same ones as boat handling in the situation of the Fastnet start which was under discussion. You could have a big main and a small jib or a small main and a big jib and either can be trimmed to keep the boat in the groove, or not. Knowing how to do that is one of the skills of boat handling, IMHO.
Nowhere have I said anything like the claim that seamanship is just the ability to sail a boat in the groove, so I can't see why you imply I did. Seamanship encompasses things down to how to sleep and inspecting the boat when you're under storm gear. Nothing I wrote came anywhere close to inferring that it was only the ability to sail a boat in the groove, or that the conditions in the vid we were discussing were survival conditions.
I've been lucky enough to hear talks about the '79 Fastnet or discuss it with a few people who were there, and there was a lot written about it. The talk that some from the AC team gave at MHYC, which I went to, were later published in Australian Sailing under the title "The Lessons of Fastnet" and I still have my copy, so there's no doubting what was said. There were also several books about the race and an official report, of which I have a copy.
No one I spoke to or heard from or read about were "sailing on regardless", but a bunch of those who got through it have been good enough to share their experiences so that we could learn from them. I'm not sure why the opinions of people who weren't there should be held higher than the opinions of people who were there and sailed through it. If the actions of the racing sailors were the problem then it's almost impossible to understand why their record was so vastly better than that of the cruisers at the same place and time, who suffered six fatalities.
Select to expand quoteMorningBird said..
I have an interview with a crew of that S&S34. It is very interesting but is in pdf format and I don't know how to post it here.
Too many people assess the consequence of a risk first, in which case you should never get out of bed as you might die if you do.
Is it the one from the 1998 inquest with Esky (Craig Escott) and John Goodfellow off Solandra, MB?
For some weird reason I can't post the link but the Google term "1998 Hobart survive inquest" brings up the webpage with most of the testimony; from memory the published versions leave out a little bit of testimony doctors gave, to save the feelings of some families of the deceased. I was at the inquest a fair bit and from what I can recall, the medical evidence was that if one had been thrown into a safety harness hard enough to snap it (which happened in one instance) then the internal injuries that would result from the torso compression meant that you would need to be on a fully-equipped operating table within about 15 minutes, max, to have any chance of survival. The boat involved did not invert. As with the deaths on Festina Tertia and Flashlight in the 1979 Fastnet, it showed that even a knockdown is dangerous and therefore the difference between a serious knockdown and an inversion may not be as significant as some sources say.
I asked one of the Solandra crew I knew how far she went over and the answer was something like "well, I spent a fair bit of time walking around the cabin ceiling, so it was a long way".
Morning Tide was pretty even by S&S 34 standards; I used to race against her eons ago. Sad that she was lost because of poor detail design.
Select to expand quoteChris 249 said..MorningBird said..
I have an interview with a crew of that S&S34. It is very interesting but is in pdf format and I don't know how to post it here.
Too many people assess the consequence of a risk first, in which case you should never get out of bed as you might die if you do.
Is it the one from the 1998 inquest with Esky (Craig Escott) and John Goodfellow off Solandra, MB?
For some weird reason I can't post the link but the Google term "1998 Hobart survive inquest" brings up the webpage with most of the testimony; from memory the published versions leave out a little bit of testimony doctors gave, to save the feelings of some families of the deceased. I was at the inquest a fair bit and from what I can recall, the medical evidence was that if one had been thrown into a safety harness hard enough to snap it (which happened in one instance) then the internal injuries that would result from the torso compression meant that you would need to be on a fully-equipped operating table within about 15 minutes, max, to have any chance of survival. The boat involved did not invert. As with the deaths on Festina Tertia and Flashlight in the 1979 Fastnet, it showed that even a knockdown is dangerous and therefore the difference between a serious knockdown and an inversion may not be as significant as some sources say.
I asked one of the Solandra crew I knew how far she went over and the answer was something like "well, I spent a fair bit of time walking around the cabin ceiling, so it was a long way".
Morning Tide was pretty even by S&S 34 standards; I used to race against her eons ago. Sad that she was lost because of poor detail design.
That is the interview. If people message me their email I'll send it on.
Solandra did not from my recollection do a 360 or even a 180. Maybe a 150. I haven't experienced a knock down anything like that. Morning Bird got pushed to maybe 70-80 degrees on one occasion and that was pretty slow, a push sideways down a breaking wave.
Alan Fenwick, Morning Tide's owner, and I talked extensively over what happened. He was with Peter Crozier's (Alex Whitworth's crewmate on the epic round the world trip in the Brolga 33 Berrimilla) daughter, both very experienced sailors.
Morning Tide was knocked flat very violently, the most violent knockdown Alan said he had experienced. It was about 0100 and they were bailing all night and couldn't find the leak. From memory Morning Tide had a sail drive so the rudder wasn't easily visible. Maybe they had a lot of stuff stowed under the cockpit.
When they were both exhausted they set the epirb off. Alan said at daybreak he located the leak which was a chunk of the rudder post riser had broken off.
The helicopter was overhead and they either took it or remained with the boat without a rescue option. They got winched up and watched as the yacht sank.
Jim Lawler, who I recall was lost in the 98 S2H on Winston Churchill, was an earlier owner of Morning Tide and I think he did the rudder mod. He sailed the boat successfully for many years with that rudder so it wasn't necessarily a poorly done mod. But it did contribute to the loads that caused the final damage.
I think it was the year before that Alan was on watch on return from Hobart when they got rolled and lost the mast. Can't remember which yacht but possibly Berrimilla. He was on Berrimilla in the 98 S2H when they survived the blow and continued racing to Hobart. He also has the most voyages to Lord Howe I am aware of. A very experienced guy who I learnt a lot from about sailing S&S34s.
A lesson I learnt from Morning Tide and my own experience with a Cole 43 is not to sail on boats with modified rudders.
In I think 2013 I wanted to do the Lord Howe rally and MB wasn't ready or I couldn't get crew. I was asked to skipper a Cole 43 and helped sail the boat to Newcastle as part of the preparation. It had several defects, so the owner had the boat hauled out in Newcastle. I saw that the rudder was a good 60cm extended below a standard Cole 43 (same skeg hung rudder as the S&S) and the rudder had dropped a few cm. The chippy said it was Ok and they couldn't put it back in position without major work.
We set off from Newcastle about mid-morning, 3 handed. At about 1600 I went to have a rest as I had the first night watch. Laying in my bunk I hear the owner say to the other fellow (a non-sailor) 'don't panic don't panic'. I rushed on deck to find the top mount for the rudder post, a fitting on the lazarette seating, flopping around with only one of four bolts there and loose the others having broken or come adrift.
I took the helm, dropped the main and sailed the boat slowly on the heady. It was pretty calm but in maybe a 1-2 metre swell. The owner then spent a few hours contorted below decks securing the fitting.
When he had finished he indicated we would continue to Lord Howe. I turned the boat around and we returned to Newcastle.
The top of the rudder post did not fit hard up in the top fitting meaning that it worked the fitting every time it moved. The extended rudder below the skeg increased the loads and the fitting failed. I don't know why it didn't do damage to the hull where the post went through. If it happened after dark we wouldn't have known and it would have broken the hull below the water line. It still gives me goose pumps..
Boat designers have a reason they made things the way they did. Make major changes at your peril.
Links to Craig Escott 98 Sydney to Hobart police report can be found on the ss34 association website.
Look in the following link for 10b, Craig Escott
www.equipped.org/sydney-hobart/Volume%2010.htm
Or download from following
www.equipped.org/sydney-hobart/Vol%2010%20Docs/ESCOTT%20Craig.PDF
Select to expand quoteMorningBird said..
Solandra did not from my recollection do a 360 or even a 180.
Solandra's David Goodfellow said in his statement (in the link) that she "imagined" he went 180, and he referred to the boat being "upside down" for about 30 seconds.
The Esky/Lewis interviews are not specific; Guy Lewis said she "did a major, major knockdown and roll" but later said he couldn't be sure how far she went.
It was partly to clear it up that I asked Tim about his recollection. He was sure she went all the way over. I don't know Tim well but he seems a level-headed and smart guy who is a very good all-round sailor. Tim was also a witness and assisted with a completely unrelated serious sailing incident and another witness who was involved said Tim played a role in saving a life and stopping the injured person from spending life in a wheelchair, so there's evidence that Tim's got a good head in an emergency and therefore a pretty good witness.
Select to expand quoteChris 249 said..MorningBird said..
Solandra did not from my recollection do a 360 or even a 180.
Solandra's David Goodfellow said in his statement (in the link) that she "imagined" he went 180, and he referred to the boat being "upside down" for about 30 seconds.
The Esky/Lewis interviews are not specific; Guy Lewis said she "did a major, major knockdown and roll" but later said he couldn't be sure how far she went.
It was partly to clear it up that I asked Tim about his recollection. He was sure she went all the way over. I don't know Tim well but he seems a level-headed and smart guy who is a very good all-round sailor. Tim was also a witness and assisted with a completely unrelated serious sailing incident and another witness who was involved said Tim played a role in saving a life and stopping the injured person from spending life in a wheelchair, so there's evidence that Tim's got a good head in an emergency and therefore a pretty good witness.
It could well have been 180. Staying that way for as long as 30 seconds would support it was a full 180 as the boat must have been stable inverted.
Select to expand quoteChris 249 said..
It's interesting, though ..
cammd said..
I think racing crews tend to keep sailing regardless of the conditions rather than employ other survival tactics such as heaving to or using drag devices, that should be taken into account.
I had to heave to during one of the Lord Howe races, just to save the boat and crew from the incessant pounding. Was far more comfortable once we did. Interestingly, 8 or so hours hove to didn't hurt our race placing at all, and the boats who tried to power on through it had far more damage than we did.
Select to expand quoteMorningBird said..cammd said..
Yep!
Yes. So much easier to put one in early.
If you are thinking about putting a reef in its too late! If you are thinking about taking it out have a cup of tea and wait!
